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This paper extends the theory of subset team games, a generalization of cooperative game theory
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define both altruistic and selfish contributions of a player to the team. We investigate properties
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I INTRODUCTION
“At the interface between [game theory and social choice theory] we find ourselves
in a bare landscape dominated by a single large question: what is required to
unite the rationality of the individual and the rationality of the group?” –Michael
Bacharach (2001)
Classical cooperative game theory as introduced by von Neumann (1928) is typically used to
analyze situations such as oligopolies, when several companies work together to increase their
own individual profits. In contrast, many forms of cooperation involve altruism, in which indi-
viduals subjugate their interests to those of the group. Consider the user-written encyclopedia
Wikipedia, which relies on contributions of thousands of volunteers, who often gain little in-
dividual benefit from their contributions. In the military, individuals are systematically trained
to suppress their individual desires for the good of the group. The golden rule encourages
cooperation based upon another’s good.
Applying cooperative game theory to such situations requires some mental gymnastics, par-
ticularly the argument that every individual has a hidden ‘utility’ that drives every single behav-
ior. While there is truth to this approach, in reality individuals must balance several different
utilities, and often make choices to improve a group utility rather than an individual utility, as
shown experimentally by Colman et al. (2008). In the natural world, several instances of this
kind of group behavior have been collected by Dugatkin (1999).
This paper extends the theory of subset team games, and demonstrates their usefulness as
a unifier of individual and group utilities. This framework was first defined by Arney and
Peterson (2008), and builds upon von Neumann’s theory while still leaving room for team-
oriented aspects of cooperation. Our principle tool is the notion of cooperation space, which
expands the traditional concept of a marginal contribution in classical cooperative game theory
into two dimensions. Given a subset utility function, as defined in section III, one may compute
metrics of altruism aA and selfish contribution cA for each subset of players A. The location
of the coordinate (aA,cA) in cooperation space has dramatically different implications for the
team. Behaviors in Quadrant I provide the most stability and represent true teamwork, while
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those in Quadrant II are often found in antagonistic entities such as oligopolies or two-party
political systems.
A related approach was pioneered by Bacharach (1999), who introduced the idea of frames
in the early 1990s to overcome the difficulties in traditional game theory created by Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Hi-Lo Game. His work was posthumously collected in Bacharach (2006),
and has since been furthered by Sugden (2008) and others. Frames provide a way to reconcile
individual and group utilities, allowing for the possibility of team reasoning at the individual
level. Individuals applying this behavior compute the optimal strategy for the team, and behave
as required by that strategy.
We begin with a review of cooperative game theory in section II, and then go on to define
subset team games and explore their properties in section III. The highlights of this section
include metrics for altruism and selfish contributions (Definition 2), the idea of a cooperation
space, and additivity properties. The remainder of the paper is devoted to two applications of
the theory. Section IV applies the framework to Prisoner’s Dilemma, while section V contains
an extended quantitative analysis of a Cobb-Douglas utility.
II CLASSICAL COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
Our framework is an extension of von Neumann’s cooperative game theory (1928). The book by
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) is more comprehensive, while a more modern treatment
of this classic material is given by Myerson (1997).
(a) TU games
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game), sometimes called a coalition game,
consists of (i) a set of players T and (ii) a payoff function (or utility function) u : 2T → R
associating a particular value or utility to each subset of T .
Note that 2T is the collection of all subsets of T . A specific subset S⊂ T is called a coalition,
and u(S) is interpreted as the maximum payoff obtained when these players work together.
Roughly speaking, transferable utility indicates that each player has the same value system, so
that u(S) may be partitioned among the players.
The marginal contribution of a player a 6∈ S to a coalition S is
(1) ma(S)≡ u(S∪{a})−u(S).
This measures the difference in utility of outcome with and without the player a. It is easily
generalized to marginal contributions mA(B) = u(A∪B)−u(B) between disjoint subsets.
(b) Allocations
Assume the team T consists of n players denoted 1,2, . . . ,n. An allocation φ ∈ Rn is a division
of the value u(T ) earned by the entire population to its players with ∑iφi = u(T ). The Shapley
value is the important case defined by
(2) φSVi = ∑
S⊂T\{i}
|S|!(n−1−|S|)!
n! mi(S∪{i}) =
1
n
n−1
∑
k=0
1(n−1
k
) ∑
S⊂T\{i}
|S|=k
mi(S∪{i}),
where
(n−1
|S|
)
= (n−1)!|S|!(n−1−|S|)! is the number of ways to select a subset of size |S| out of T \ {i}.
Thus, each player is compensated in proportion to their average marginal contribution. With
respect to certain axioms, the Shapley value can be said to be the “fairest” possible allocation.
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The core of a TU game is the set of allocations φ ∈ Rn such that ∑i∈S φi ≥ u(S) for all
coalitions S ⊂ T . Under an allocation in the core, no subset of T could “defect” and obtain a
better payoff. When the core is nonempty, all players have reason to participate. The Shapley
value is not always in the core, and the core may not even exist in some cases. However, the
cases in which it is in the core can be partially classified.
A utility function u is convex if
(3) mi(S∪{i})≤ mi(S′∪{i})
for all S⊂ S′ and i 6∈ S. This means that marginal contributions increase weakly with the size of
the coalition. It is not too difficult to show that if a TU game is convex, then the Shapley value
is in the core of the game.
A TU game is said to be superadditive if u(A∪B) ≥ u(A)+ u(B), or equivalently mA(B) ≥
u(A) for all disjoint pairs A,B. In this case, mi(S)≥ u({i}), and so φSVi ≥ u({i}) for all i. This
means the Shapley value is individually rational.
(c) NTU games
A cooperative game with non-transferable utility (NTU game) consists of (i) a set of players T ,
(ii) a set X of possible outcomes, (iii) a consequence function V : 2T → X assigning an outcome
to each coalition S⊂ T , and (iv) a payoff or utility function ua : X → R, defined for each player
a ∈ T , that associates a value to each possible outcome.
III SUBSET TEAM GAMES
Subset team games generalize cooperative games by allowing each subset of players to have a
different assessment of the value of an outcome. The added complexity of the setup allows the
marginal contribution to be partitioned into a “selfish contribution” and an “altruistic contribu-
tion.” Definitions 1 and 2 were first published by Arney and Peterson (2008).
Definition 1 A subset team game (ST game) consists of (i) a team of players T , (ii) a set X of
possible outcomes, (iii) a consequence function V : 2T → X mapping each coalition S ⊂ T to
an outcome, and (iv) a payoff or utility function uA : X → R, defined for each subset A⊂ T .
The subset utility is the function uA(S) ≡ uA(V (S)). In the context of uA(S), we call A the
assessing subset, and S the coalition. Frequently it makes sense to assume that A⊂ S.
(a) Altruism and Selfishness
Definition 2 Let A,B ⊂ T be disjoint coalitions. Given the subset utility u, the total marginal
contribution of A to A∪B is
(4) mA(A∪B)≡ uA∪B(A∪B)−uB(B).
The competitive contribution of A to A∪B is
(5) cA(A∪B)≡ uA∪B(A∪B)−uB(A∪B).
The altruistic contribution of A to A∪B is
(6) aA(A∪B)≡ uB(A∪B)−uB(B).
3
Note that the altruistic contribution compares different outcomes, while the competitive contri-
bution compares different assessments. It is immediate that
(7) mA(A∪B) = cA(A∪B)+aA(A∪B).
We will use mA ≡mA(T ), cA ≡ cA(T ), and sA ≡ sA(T ) to denote the values when the participat-
ing coalition is the entire team T . A schematic of these notions is given in Figure 1.
V (A∪B)
V (A)
V (B)
uA∪B(A∪B)
uA(A∪B) uA(A)
aB(A∪B)
cB(A∪B)
uB(A∪B) uB(B)
aA(A∪B)
cA(A
∪B)
mB(A∪B)
mA(A∪B)
FIGURE 1
SUBSET UTILITIES FOR DISJOINT SUBSETS, GROUPED BY OUTCOME.
These metrics permit an analysis of the types of contribution made by any subset of players.
We will show that cooperation is maximized when the values of cA(B) and aA(B) are as high as
possible; zero or negative values indicate instabilities in the group.
Example 1 Suppose that cA(A∪B) = 0 for all disjoint A,B ⊂ T . Then uA∪B(A∪B) = uB(A∪
B) = uA(A∪B), implying that the subsets A and B value the outcome V (A∪B) equally. There-
fore, all subsets value the outcome equally. Consequently, zero selfish cooperation implies that
individual value is meaningless; all parts subjugate their own interests to that of the team.
So there is a function u : X → R such that u = uS for all subsets S⊂ T , and the game reduces
to a TU game.
(b) Sensible, Cohesive, and Fully-Cooperative ST Games
A negative value cA(A∪B) is a rather curious condition, implying that B by itself values the
outcome V (A∪B) more than the coalition A∪B values that outcome. It is possible to define
subset utilities that have this property, but they are generally outside the scope of our goals for
this paper. We generally assume the following condition:
Definition 3 An ST game is sensible if cA(A∪B)≥ 0 for all disjoint A,B⊂ S.
Example 2 Suppose that aA(A∪B) = 0 for all disjoint A,B ⊂ T . Then uB(A∪B) = uB(B),
meaning both outcomes have equal value to B. Therefore, all outcomes in which B participates
have equal value to B. Teamwork is meaningless since no player or group of players will gain
anything, or lose anything, by working together.
If some altruistic values are negative, then uB(A∪B) < uB(B), implying the coalition B would
do better on its own than with the team, and the group will probably be unstable.
This property of altruism motivates the definition of the ST -core:
4
Definition 4 Given an ST game, a coalition S ⊂ T is cohesive if aA(A∪B)≥ 0 for all disjoint
A,B ⊂ S. If all coalitions within a game are cohesive, the ST game is fully-cooperative. The
core of a consequence function V : 2T → X is the set of utility functions that create a fully-
cooperative game.
To summarize, most ST games of interest will be sensible, and games in which teams are likely
to be stable are fully-cooperative.
(c) Cooperation space
Given a subset utility u and a subset A⊂ T , the pair (aA,cA) represents a point in what we call
cooperation space. Figure 2 shows this space along with the regions marked by sensibility and
cohesiveness. The marginal contribution mA is positive above the diagonal line aA+ cA = 0.
sensible
cohesive
mA
m
A =
0
cA
aA
FIGURE 2
COOPERATION SPACE. IDEAL TEAM BEHAVIORS TAKE VALUES IN QUADRANT I.
An ST game with n players produces 2n points in cooperation space. If these are all in
Quadrant I, the game is both sensible and fully-cooperative. This represents ideal teamwork
since every subset of players provides benefit both to the team and to other subsets. If some
subsets are in Quadrant II, then their behavior decreases the utility of the outcome to some of
the players. Quadrants III and IV indicate behaviors arising from non-sensible utilities.
If a subset A has a choice between several different behaviors, one may plot each resulting
subset utility in cooperation space. From the team point-of-view, behaviors lying in Quadrant I
are the most desirable since they both improve team utility and maintain team stability. Behav-
iors in Quadrant II with positive marginal contributions are less desirable since team stability is
lost. Without external pressure, it is possible the team may break apart because it is rational for
certain subsets to do so. Behaviors in Quadrant II have a negative impact on both team utility
and team stability. In section V, we use these ideas to assess behaviors in a game defined using
a certain Cobb-Douglas utility function.
(d) Additivity
Example 3 Every NTU game with individual utilities ua : X → R is also a subset team game.
Set uA(B) = ∑a∈A ua(V (B)). Then
(8) cA(A∪B) = ∑
a∈A∪B
ua(A∪B)−∑
a∈B
ua(A∪B) = ∑
a∈A
ua(A∪B) = uA(A∪B).
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Therefore, the competitive contributions are precisely the group utilities, and the game is sensi-
ble when the utilities are all positive.
In additive games, the value of an outcome is partitioned among the different players. As
hinted above, additive ST games can also be used to define NTU games.
Definition 5 A subset utility uA(S) is additive or linear if
(9) uA(S) = ∑
a∈A
ua(S)
for all A⊂ S⊂ T .
Proposition 1 If a subset utility uA(S) is additive, then (i) cA(A∪B) = uA(A∪B) =∑a∈A ua(A∪
B); (ii) aA(A∪B) = ∑b∈B (ub(A∪B)−ub(B)); (iii) the game is sensible if and only if ua(A∪
B)≥ 0 for all a ∈ A; and (iv) the game is fully-cooperative if and only if ub(A∪B)≥ ub(B) for
all players b ∈ B.
Given the relationship between stability and cohesiveness, the fourth statement above implies
that a team is stable when each player does better with the addition of the players in B.
A similar notion is the following.
Definition 6 A subset utility uA(S) is co-additive if
(10) uA(S) = ∑
b∈S
uA(b)
for all A⊂ S⊂ T . It is bi-additive if it is both additive and co-additive.
Co-additivity implies that each subset A⊂ T has a unique assessment of the value of the player
b ∈ B to the team, when that player participates. Otherwise put, the outcome is in some sense
additive relative to the participants. A coalition A will want any player b with uA(b)≥ 0 to join.
Proposition 2 If a subset payoff function is co-additive, then (i) aA(A ∪ B) = uB(A) =
∑a∈A uB(a); (ii) cA(A∪B) = ∑b∈A∪B (uA∪B(b)−uB(b)); (iii) the game is fully-cooperative if
and only if uB(a)≥ 0 for all a 6∈ B; and (iv) the game is sensible if and only if uA∪B(b)≥ uB(b)
for all b ∈ A∪B.
Proposition 3 If a subset payoff function is bi-additive, then
(11) uA(S) = ∑
a∈A,b∈S
ua(b).
Moreover, cA(A∪B) = uA(A∪B) and aA(A∪B) = uB(A).
If a bi-additive subset team game is fully-cooperative and ua(a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ T , then it is
sensible.
In bi-additive games, the subset utility is determined by a n×n matrix of values, where n is
the number of players. The entries of the matrix are individual perceptions of other players’
contribution to the team. Alternately, bi-additive ST games may be represented by a weighted
graph, where the vertices are players and the edge from a to a is labeled by ua(b), the perceived
value of b to a. Then, the competitive contribution of a subset A is uA(A∪B), the total weighted
degree of edges terminating in A. The altruistic contribution of a subset A is uB(A), the total
weighted degree of edges starting in A and terminating outside A. See Figure 3.
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cA(A∪B)
aA(A∪B)
FIGURE 3
ALTRUISTIC AND COMPETITIVE COOPERATION FOR A BI-ADDITIVE SUBSET TEAM GAME.
IV PRISONER’S DILEMMA
This section applies subset team games to a simple scenario. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a two-
player game in which players are being interrogated, and must decide whether to keep silent
(cooperating) or turn in their partner (defecting). A representative payoff matrix follows.
3,0 1,1
2,2 0,3
def
coop
coop def
The dilemma arises because the rational choice for both players is to defect. On the other
hand, they would do better if both chose to cooperate. In social experiments, real players often
do choose to cooperate, as shown in a number of studies collected by Sally (1995). There are a
number of ways to resolve this paradox.
• Lack of Information. In real life, players do not always know what is in their best
interest.
• Misrepresentation of Values. The utility given does not represent the player’s actual
best interests.
• Iteration and Trust. If the game is repeated many times, it is rational for players to
develop trust and cooperate with those they trust (an approach studied extensively by
Axelrod (1984)).
From the viewpoint of subset team games, it makes sense to consider players as either work-
ing together as a “team” or working separately. Each situation provides a different value to the
players, as follows:
utility V (A,B) V (A) V (B)
uA,B 4 - -
uA 2 1 -
uB 2 - 1
Individually, the best a player can hope to receive is 1. But if they work as a team, their
individual utility goes up to 2. This means that each player’s altruistic contribution is 1. The
team’s overall utility is 4, so each player’s selfish contribution is 2.
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Therefore, the team utility occupies Quadrant I of cooperation space; the game is both sensi-
ble and fully-cooperative. Since the altruistic contributions are positive, teamwork is “robust”
in the sense that working apart gives a worse outcome. The conditions are right for teamwork
to flourish. This does not mean that an individual cannot stand to gain by defecting, merely that
defecting provides a poor long-term strategy.
V TEAMWORK WITH A COBB-DOUGLAS UTILITY FUNCTION
We now consider a more complex scenario. There are several ways to assess the value of
outcomes consisting of two measurable quantities that are both desirable. For 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, the
Cobb-Douglas utility function
(12) Uθ (y,z) = yθ z1−θ
puts the highest value on outcomes that balance two positive quantities y and z. In particular,
when y+z is fixed, elementary calculus can be used to show that the maximum value for Uθ (y,z)
occurs when y =
( θ
1−θ
)
z.
We consider an ST game in which each player in T has a fixed pool of resources to contribute.
The combined contributions of the participating players determines the value of the outcome,
which is in turn divided up among the players. This section follows an approach similar to that
of Axtell (2002), who evaluated many of the same concepts from a different point-of-view. The
main difference is the focus here on altruism, selfish contributions, and cooperation space.
(a) Definitions
Given a player a ∈ T , let Xa denote that player’s resources, and xa ≤ Xa their contributions. Let
xˆa = Xa− xa represent the amount of resources kept in reserve. Given a subset S ⊂ T , define
xˆS = XS− xS similarly.
Let f (xS) be the total value of the outcome given the contribution xS by a subset S ⊂ T , let
fa(S)≥ 0 denote the resulting payment to a player a ∈ S, and let fA(S) =∑a∈A fa(S) denote the
payment to a subset A ⊂ S. We require fS(S) ≤ f (xS), since f (xS) is the maximum value that
can be distributed among the players.
One obtains an ST game with subset utility
(13) uA(S) =Uθ ( fA(S), xˆA) = ( fA(S))
θ (xˆA)
1−θ .
This means that the subset A wishes to balance its payment fA(S) with its reserves xˆA.
The game is in general neither additive nor co-additive. However, it is always sensible:
Proposition 4 The subset utility UA(S) defined in (13) is always sensible. It is fully-cooperative
if and only if fB(A∪B)≥ fB(B).
Intuitively, the fully-cooperative condition means that as the pool of resources increases, so
does each player’s payoff.
(b) Payoff Schemes
For the remainder of the section, assume that f is continuous and differentiable with f (0) = 0.
We will investigate three different total allocations f (xS) = ∑a∈S fa(xS) = fS(S), defined as
follows:
• fA(S) = xAxS f (xS) (proportional);
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• gA(S) = |A||S| f (xS), where |A| is the number of players in the subset A (equal);
• hA(S) = γ fA(S)+(1− γ)gA(S) for 0≤ γ ≤ 1 (hybrid).
Since fS(S) = gS(S) = hS(S) = f (xS), all three payoffs divide the entire value achieved by S.
As Axtell (2002) mentions, proportional payoffs are ideal but somewhat impractical since it
requires perfect knowledge of player’s contributions and resources. On the other hand, equal
payoffs are ripe for exploitation.
Figure 4a shows the payoffs hA(A∪B) for f (x) = x1.5 and various values of γ . Figure 4b
shows the subset utility uA(A∪B) for θ = 0.75, indicating a significant preference for reward
over reserve resources. The leftmost graphs indicate equal payoffs, and the rightmost indicate
proportional payoffs.
(a)
(b)
FIGURE 4
HYBRID PAYOFFS (A) AND UTILITIES (B) FOR A SUBSET A OF PLAYERS A∪B GIVEN THE
VALUE FUNCTION f (x) = x1.5, AS A FUNCTION OF THE AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS OF
PLAYERS IN DISJOINT SUBSETS OF SIZE |A|= 2 (HORIZONTAL AXIS) AND |B|= 10
(VERTICAL AXIS).
(c) Team Stability
Axtell (2002) notes that equal and hybrid payoffs may give rise to nonstable teams. One ob-
tains the same conclusion by considering cooperation space. The game is stable when rational
individual and team strategies lie in Quadrant I of cooperation space, as mentioned in section
(c). By Proposition 4, this occurs when fB(A∪B)≥ fB(B).
In the proportional payoff case, this means xBxA+xB f (xA+xB)≥ f (xB). This condition is always
satisfied by a function with
(14)
f (y)
y
≥ f (x)
x
for y ≥ x, which implies
(
f (x)
x
)′ ≥ 0 or f ′(x) ≥ f (x)x . So the rate of return on contributions
increases with the size of the contributions.
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FIGURE 5
THE MAXIMUM STABLE TEAM SIZE AS A FUNCTION OF γ AND xbxS . BELOW THE CURVES,
ALL TEAM SIZES ARE STABLE.
For equal payoffs, one may rewrite the condition |B||A|+|B| f (xA+ xB)≥ f (xB) as
(15)
f (xS)
|S| ≥
f (xB)
|B| ,
where S = A∪B. So the average return must increase with the size of the group. The only
nonnegative function that can satisfy this property universally is f = 0, since the left side may
be made arbitrarily small by increasing |A| while keeping xA fixed. Large groups can only
be cohesive if their contributions are analogously large. In the case |B| = 1, the inequality
simplifies to f (xb) ≤ f (xS)|S| , so a single player’s contribution is limited by the average value
achieved. A player that contributes more than his share will be tempted to leave the group.
The same analysis holds in the hybrid case, although the formulas become more complicated.
Setting A∪B = S and |B|= 1 again, the condition in Proposition 4 becomes
(16)
(
γ
xb
xS
+(1− γ) 1|S|
)
f (xS)≥ f (xb).
Again, no function f 6= 0 will work universally (unless γ = 1), and the group size is limited,
although to a lesser extent, by the size of individual contributions.
(d) A Specific Case
We will now focus on the specific case of a power function f (x) = αxβ with α > 0 and β > 1.
Such a function satisfies f ′(x) ≥ f (x)x , and so leads to a fully-cooperative game in the case of
proportional payoffs. In the equal payoff case, the group size condition reduces to |S| ≤
(
xS
xb
)β
.
In the hybrid payoff case, the group size condition reduces to
(17) |S| ≤ 1− γ(
xb
xS
)β − γ xbxS
if the denominator is positive. (If the denominator is negative, then |S| may be taken to be
arbitrarily large.) The maximum stable team sizes for various values of γ and xbxS is shown in
Figure 5.
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FIGURE 6
RATIONAL CHOICES FOR A (THICK LINES) AS A FUNCTION OF AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR B, OVERLAID WITH ZERO ALTRUISM LINES, FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF γ AND |B|.
FIGURE 7
PATHS OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN COOPERATION SPACE. THE CURVES HAVE PARAMETER
xB
|B| ∈ [0,1], AND EACH CURVE REPRESENTS A DIFFERENT VALUE OF γ .
From an economic standpoint, players are apt to make rational choices, choosing to con-
tribute an amount that maximizes their own utility. Will this produce a stable result? Figure
6 shows rational contributions, as a function of the average contribution of a disjoint subset B,
overlayed with lines of 0 altruism aA(A∪B) = 0. If a contribution is above the line, the coalition
is cohesive. When the lines for some γ intersect, however, there is a range of values where an
individual’s optimal contribution leads to a non-cohesive team. In such cases, players have the
opportunity to “cheat” or “free-ride” by taking advantage of near-equal payoffs.
We can also examine the game in cooperation space. Figure 7 shows curves with a single
parameter representing the average contribution xB|B| . The behavior of subset A is the rational
behavior as indicated in Figure 6. Multiple paths are plotted, for values of γ between 0 and 1,
and each plot shows a different value of |B|. These plots capture in a single figure the value of
the subset team game framework. One can make the following observations:
• When the team sizes are equal (first graph), the game is always fully-cooperative; the
worst case for stability occurs when |B| is much larger than |A| (third graph).
• Team stability is greater for equal payoffs (γ = 0) when xB|B| is small, but greater for pro-
portional payoffs (γ = 1) in general. This is seen by comparing the starting locations of
the curves ( xB|B| = 0) with their endpoints (
xB
|B| = 1).
• The marginal contributions associated with rational behavior increase as γ approaches 1.
• As xB|B| approaches 1, the value of “cheating” increases significantly for small γ . This
indicates that the players in A are taking advantage of the larger contributions of B.
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In short, the payoff scheme can have dramatic implications for the cohesivity of the team,
ensuring that players are not marginalized.
VI CONCLUSION
The subset team game framework unifies individual and team utilities, and is general enough
to apply to a wide variety of scenarios. Perhaps the most important contribution is the idea of
cooperation space and the specific metrics of altruism and selfish cooperation. This extends the
marginal contribution mA to a pair (aA,cA), as visualized in Figures 2 and 7. The applications
of this viewpoint are endless. One could promote team stability and optimize a team’s success
by changing the payoff scheme to increase the level of altruism; one could identify “cheaters”
within a system by investigating the behavior of individual or subsets in this space; one could
identify situations in which additional incentives are required to encourage individuals to work
together.
These ideas might also be applied to evolutionary models of team formation, with teams
allowed to form when individual behaviors are grouped together in Quadrant I of cooperation
space. It is an open and interesting question whether teams that adopt rules forcing constituents
to have some degree of altruism are more successful in the long run than teams with no such
rules. In one sense, it is required to ensure team stability. For example, two-party political
systems tend to live in Quadrant II since they have opposing viewpoints, and consequently
often find it very difficult to pass certain kinds of legislation.
The difficulty in practice comes in finding suitable functions for subset utilities, which re-
quire a significant amount of information. This paper has shown how the process might work
in the case of balancing resource reserves, using a Cobb-Douglas function. The ideal real-
world solution is to balance equal and proportional payoffs, perhaps using estimates of player
contributions rather than precise values. The analysis in this paper provides one step towards
understanding dynamic groups in the presence of individual goals.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 1 AND 2
Condition (i) follows from (8) and (ii) follows from the definition of altruistic contribution.
Then (i) implies (iii) and (ii) implies (iv). The proof of Proposition 2 is similarly straightfor-
ward.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The first statement follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 2.
For the second statement, note that cA(A∪ B) = uA(A∪ B) = uA(A) + uA(B). The fully-
cooperative condition implies uA(B) ≥ 0, while together with ua(a) ≥ 0 it implies uA(A) ≥ 0.
Therefore, the two conditions imply cA(A∪B)≥ 0, which is the condition for sensibility.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Since xˆA∪B ≥ xˆB and fA∪B(A∪B)≥ fB(A∪B), it follows that
(18) cA(A∪B) = ( fA∪B(A∪B))θ (xˆA∪B)1−θ − ( fB(A∪B))θ (xˆB)1−θ ≥ 0.
Therefore, the game is always sensible.
The altruistic contribution is
(19) aA(A∪B) = ( fB(A∪B))θ (xˆB)1−θ − ( fB(B))θ (xˆB)1−θ
=
(
( fB(A∪B))θ − ( fB(B))θ
)
(xˆB)
1−θ .
12
So the game is fully-cooperative if and only if fB(A∪B)≥ fB(B) for all disjoint A,B.
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